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In the past several election cycles, Americans have experienced too many uncertain electoral results; many of these problems have been attributable to inadequate or malfunctioning voting technology and vote-counting systems.
In 2006 alone multiple failures of direct recording electronic voting systems (DREs) resulted in tens of thousands of problems, including: delays in the opening of the polls and long lines that discouraged people from casting their votes; "jumping screens" and lost votes; paper trail jams and paper trails not matching the electronic screens; reports of inaccessibility for voters with disabilities; machine failures in retrieving results; and extensive security concerns with the recording of votes.
In light of these continuing problems and the need for clear national guidelines for voting technology, Demos has established a set of recommendations for voting systems in U.S. elections.
These guidelines are grounded in the basic principle that a paper ballot is required for voters to have full confidence in our elections. Paper ballots include those counted by an optical-scan system or by hand, and marked by hand or by a ballot marking device. This requirement is needed to help ensure that every legally registered voter can vote, that every vote is recorded precisely as the voter intends, and that every vote is counted and can, if necessary, be accurately re-counted. "Paper trails" and paper records are insufficient. Unless there is a paper ballot for every vote cast, three fundamental principles of democratic elections are violated:
1. Observable tallies. It is impossible for citizens to observe the counting of electronic ballots and audit the results.
2. Equal access. Requiring voters to cast votes on computers disadvantages those who are unfamiliar with the technology, such as older voters. Moreover, when computer voting systems fail, the voters who lose out are most often those who are intimidated by technology; are less confident about voting--and perhaps voting for the first time; and those who cannot afford to come back later after repairs have been made.
3. Accurate results. It is impossible to ensure that the reported results are accurate. We cannot depend on a voter-verified paper audit trail to provide the certainty lacking in electronic tallies. For instance, such a paper trail would not have explained the 18,000 "disappeared" votes in Florida's 13th
Congressional district election in 2006. With most voters not verifying their votes on the paper trail--as studies have shown, many, if not all, of those votes would still be lost.
States and localities may find it difficult to accept that public dollars were misspent on new DRE systems. But it would be far worse to continue using election equipment that can not meet minimal fundamental requirements of democratic elections. If this were a public safety matter, no one would question the discontinuance of a dangerous product, even if it had been funded by billions of public dollars. Demos believes that protecting the safety of our electoral process requires the same resolve.
Demos also believes that our voting technology must address concerns of voters with disabilities and language minority voters, and we support paper ballot standards that meet those concerns. See the attached document for our full set of principles for accessible and trustworthy voting systems.
Demos' principles for voting systems
Recognizing the paramount importance of the paper ballot for the integrity of our elections, Demos embraces the following principles for trustworthy and accessible voting systems:
A. Design Specifications for Voting Systems
1) Security. All voting systems must be made as inclusive in nature, design, and implementation as possible by making available the best functionality to facilitate the marking, casting, verification, and tabulation of ballots. Regardless of the voting equipment used, all voting systems must provide a secure means for the voter to privately and independently record his or her votes on a paper ballot and to privately and independently verify that the votes are accurately recorded before the voter casts the ballot. This principle specifically excludes, therefore, the continued use of DREs in the recording and counting of our votes.
2) Voting by People with disabilities. Every polling location must provide a secure means for the voter, including a voter with one or more disabilities, to privately and independently record his or her vote on a paper ballot, through the use of an assistive interface if needed, and to privately and independently verify that the votes are accurately recorded before the voter casts the ballot.
3) Voting by Language minorities. Any polling place required under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 or applicable court order to provide for voting in a language other than English must provide paper ballots and any necessary instruction and information in the applicable minority language, such that language minority voters can privately and independently record their votes and verify that their votes are accurately recorded before the voters casts their ballots.
4) Usability by poll workers. A voting system must meet standards of usability such that it can be successfully operated by poll workers who have no specialized expertise.
5) Wireless technology. Use of wireless technology in voting systems must be barred.
B. Paper as the Official Legal Record of Voter Intent
6) The paper ballot cast by the voter shall be the official legal record of voter intent, and must be the record used for obtaining the certified tally of election results and for all audits and recounts. Exceptions to this can be made only when there is compelling evidence that the paper ballot was compromised.
C. Random Mandatory Manual Audits Must Be Required
7) A voting system meeting the foregoing criteria must, to be trustworthy, be accompanied by legislation requiring robust and truly random manual audits of a predetermined percentage of precincts for every contest to determine the accuracy of any electronic count and tabulation of the ballots, as well as routine audits of the entire voting process, from registration to tabulation and certification.
D. Public Funding for New or Upgraded Voting Systems
8) No public funds should be spent on the acquisition of voting systems that do not meet the specifications set forth herein or on the upgrading or retrofitting of existing voting systems where the resulting voting system would not meet the specifications set forth herein.
9) Public funds shall be made available in order to fully implement systems that meet the principles expressed in this document.
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